The project aims at elaborating on, and assessing, a “phenomenological” model poised to account for self-consciousness – strictly understood as the subject’s experiencing of its own occurrent mental states before any reflection or introspection. Our final goal is to test the descriptive power of this model and to assess it’s relevance as an alternative to competing, representational theories in philosophy of mind. Implementation of the project is conditioned by three intermediate objectives: (1) to establish a strong presumption for the pre-reflective experience of one’s own mental states and against so-called “transparency of experience” thesis, (2) to construct and assess a non-representational or “adverbial” interpretation of Inner Perception theories in the phenomenological-descriptive tradition, and (3) to describe the modes and modalities according to which the subject experiences its own mental states, namely, in a way which is self-evident or blind, explicit or implicit, clear or obscure, distinct or confuse, veridical or “illusory”.