Abstract:

My talk will be about phenomenology understood as a discipline, an enterprise or an inquiry in philosophy, rather than as a movement in the history of philosophy: as the title suggests, it will be about the (so-called) phenomenological approach and not – or not just – about the (so-called) phenomenological …

Abstract:

Public officials—such as legislators, judges, and law enforcement officers—sometimes make mistakes. The question that this paper focusses on is whether the individuals who make these mistakes, by virtue of occupying their official role, sometimes possess a right against interference or harm that a private individual who made the same kind …

Abstract:

It is commonly held that Kant’s account of existence foreshadows Frege’s, Russell’s, and Quine’s disdain for non-existent objects. This interpretation has consequences for the interpretation of Kant’s modal metaphysics because it excludes attributing an ontology of merely possible objects (possibilia) to Kant. Consequently, it has become standard in the literature …

Abstract:

There is a growing consensus that causation can come in degrees. For instance, if two companies both emit effluents into a river, the degree to which they should be held responsible for the resulting damage depends on the degree to which they causally contributed to it. In general, if an …

Abstract:

Suspension of judgement is often closely associated with inquiry (Friedman 2017, 2019; Fritz 2020; Lord 2021).  Interestingly these philosophers have also provided an inquiry-based explanation of high stakes cases. In a nutshell, a belief that P is justified only if one ought not to inquire further. Due to insufficient attention …

Abstract : This paper examines moral intuitionism as formulated by Tropman. In Tropman’s view, moral intuitionism is best construed as the claim that some moral beliefs can be justified without being based on reasons. While this construal of the view has several advantages, it raises an important question: how can a …

Abstract: Bullshitting is prima facie wrong, and sometimes blameless. Harry Frankfurt’s famous account, according to which to bullshit is to manifest indifference to truth, fails to explain the wrongness of bullshitting and impliess that it is always blameworthy, or at least inexcusable. We should instead follow Cohen and Wreen and …