Morning session: 10–12
Afternoon session: 14–18

The morning sessions will be papers by Peacocke (we shall read them before), the afternoon session by us—and some external people I shall invite.

Description by Christopher Peacocke:
I will begin by offering some general arguments for the conclusion that the metaphysics of a domain is more fundamental in the order of philosophical explanation than the theory of intentional contents concerning that domain, and more fundamental than a theory of meaning for a language concerning that domain. This is, then, a metaphysics-first thesis. After drawing out some of the consequences of this position for the theory of intentional content and the theory of understanding, I consider the way it is realized in a number of specific domains. I will develop accounts that accord with the metaphysics-first view for: the domain of magnitudes and intentional contents for them; for time and its corresponding philosophy of mind; for abstract objects; for the self; and possibly for other domains, as the format of the Seminars permit. Finally I will show that a proper development of the metaphysics-first view permits a new, non-verificationist treatment of the limits of intelligibility. I will apply this new treatment to some classical philosophical problems.

Link to program:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1mumQUyIyW1VwouXs8SHguITA5lLAUndLLZD5Taf0HwE/edit?usp=sharing