Mar, 2017
28
EXRE Colloquium: Philipp Blum (Lucerne) “The Looks of Things”
Time: 17:15 - 19:00
(Abstract) When the stick appears bent and sugar looks red, bentness and redness
may be and have been attributed to their appearances, to how things
appear to me, to what they appear to me to be, or to the way I am
appeared to by them. I argue that this is wrong: bentness and redness do
not need to figure in our account at all. There are appearances of
things as red or bent, to be sure, but they have only appearance
properties — they themselves only appear red or bent. In my talk, I
will try to articulate this (perhaps Kantian) idea a bit further and
explore some its consequences for the argument from illusion,
McTaggart’s argument against temporal A-determinations and Jackson’s
argument in favour of perceptual qualia.