Jiri Benovsky has recently outlined a no-self view on which there are no subjects of experiences, only ‘experiences arranged self-wise’ (Eliminativism, Objects, and Persons: The Virtues of Non-Existence, 2019). Benovsky offers a novel account of the subjectivity and unity of experiences which does not involve appealing to a subject who has them. On this account, the subjectivity, phenomenality and neural characteristics of experiences are different aspects of the one event or property. The view thus combines ontological monism with a plurality of different aspects, which are not themselves properties or extra elements of being.
In this joint paper, Donnchadh O’Conaill will speak up for the self. He will argue that Benovsky’s position lacks the resources to properly characterise or explain the subjectivity of experiences. He will also argue that Benovsky’s notion of aspects does not play an important theoretical role in the account and cannot help to meet the challenges facing ontological monism. Jiri Benovsky will reply on behalf of experiences arranged self-wise.​